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Abstract
This paper examines how a firm can strategically choose its capacity to manipulate
consumer beliefs about aggregate demand. It looks at a market with social effects where
consumers want to do what is popular, to buy what they believe others want to buy. By
imposing a capacity constraint and setting a price just low enough for it to bind, the firm
can fool certain naive consumers into believing that demand is greater than it actually
is. This will in turn increase the willingness to pay of all consumers through social
effects. In equilibrium, the firm will impose a capacity constraint whenever demand is
lower than expected, even when the number of naive consumers is arbitrarily small.
1 Introduction
Firms looking to build a favorable buzz around their products can often benefit by selling
out. Dining at a particular restaurant or attending a Broadway show may be more attractive
if the restaurant is usually full, or the show difficult to get into. Concert promoters putting
new tickets on sale will often draw attention to a string of past sold-out performances.1
In professional sports, fans actively discuss and compare the consecutive sell-outs streaks
of different teams.2 The Boston Red Sox marked the occasion of 600 straight sell-outs at
Fenway Park with a widely publicized ceremony, where principal owner John W. Henry
threw 600 commemorative baseballs into the crowd.3
The desire to generate a positive buzz through sell-outs can cause firms to act strategi-
cally. Palm is reported to have stocked low numbers of its Pre phone to enhance the allure
of the product, with analysts commenting that selling out would be seen as an important
success.4 Some firms have been accused of deliberately trying to mislead consumers, using
perceived shortages as a shrewd marketing tactic. There were widespread claims that Nin-
tendo deliberately produced too few of its new, widely popular Wii console in 2006 and 2007,
1For an example with Bruce Springtime and the E Street Band, see
www.shorefire.com/index.php?a=pressreleaseo=83
2For an example in professional hockey, see http://hfboards.com/showthread.php?t=477736&page=2
3See “The Red Sox nurture a ‘Sellout’ Streak”, BusinessWeek, July 29, 2010
4www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=az5nzqH0Mt4M&refer=us
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in order to artificially increase demand.5 The Red Sox have also been accused of trying to
artificially sustain their sell-out streak, by selling tickets to secondary sellers who are willing
to bear more risk. Games are then officially sold out even if some tickets never find their
way into the hands of fans. This keeps the sell-out streak alive, which is viewed as a great
selling point for the team.6
These examples all suggest that firms may strategically restrict capacity to manipulate
consumer beliefs about aggregate demand. However, this issue does not seem to have received
any attention up until now in the economics literature. One potential reason could be the
difficulty of reconciling this idea with the common view that, in equilibrium, consumer beliefs
should be correct. By taking a somewhat different approach involving bounded rationality,
this paper aims to fill this gap.
I look at a market where consumers care about the popularity of what they buy. Con-
sumers are willing to pay more for a good if they believe it is a hit, something many others
want to buy as well. Whether it is wearing clothes of a certain brand name, going to a
particular performance at the theater, or attending a concert or sporting event, these con-
sumers care about whether something is the “in” thing to do. I refer to this consumption
externality as a social effect.
I assume consumers can observe quantity sold but not quantity demanded, which means
that a binding capacity constraint can influence their beliefs about a good’s popularity. In
the setting I examine, a binding capacity constraint will cause some consumers to infer that
demand is higher than it actually is. These consumers do not take into account that the
firm is informed about demand, and has an incentive to influence their beliefs. I refer to
these consumers as naive, and the mechanism I explore depends only on their numbers being
strictly positive.
Specifically, I consider a two period game where the firm is fully informed about the
total number of consumers in the market, but some consumers are not. Each consumer’s
willingness to pay is increasing in his expectation of quantity demanded, and a strictly
positive fraction of consumers are naive. Naive consumers are rational and update their
beliefs about demand using Bayes’ rule, except they do not directly condition these beliefs
on the firm’s equilibrium strategy.
The firm sets prices and also decides whether to impose a capacity constraint, which
if imposed must remain in place for both periods. I show that the firm can use a capacity
constraint in period 1 in order to increase demand in period 2. If the firm imposes a capacity
constraint, it will set a period 1 price such that the constraint exactly binds. Naive consumers
see that the firm has sold out, but do not realize that excess demand is actually zero. Instead,
they form an expectation about the amount of excess demand, reasoning that quantity
demanded must be greater than or equal to quantity sold. The mistaken beliefs of naive
consumers will then increase the willingness to pay of all consumers in period 2 through
social effects.
5www.cio.com/article/445316/Nintendo Wii Shortage Shrewd Marketing or Flawed Supply Chain
6www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-30/red-sox-s-ticket-policy-keeps-sellout-streak-alive-with-help-of-
resellers.html
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In particular, the firm will impose a capacity constraint whenever demand is lower than
expected, but it will not impose a capacity constraint when demand is sufficiently high.7
The firm faces a trade-off, since a binding capacity constraint will increase period 2 demand
beyond what it otherwise would have been, but will also leave the firm unable to expand
output above its period 1 level. When demand is lower than expected, the firm will impose
a capacity constraint because, in its absence, expanding output in period 2 would not have
been an issue. When demand is high, the firm will not impose a constraint because there is
little benefit to fooling naive consumers.
I also show that if the firm does impose a capacity constraint, then naive consumers
never discover that they have been fooled. Moreover, the results continue to hold when
social effects are weak, or when the number of naive consumers is arbitrarily small.
The view that social effects can generate consumption externalities goes back many years,
and includes Leibenstein (1950) and Becker (1974). Leibenstein examined how individual
demand may be increasing in aggregate demand, and termed this the bandwagon effect. The
bandwagon effect is related to work on network goods, such as Katz and Shapiro (1985),
where the eventual surplus from buying depends on the total number of consumers who
also buy. With social effects, however, the externality should be directly related to a good’s
popularity, not its sales. What matters is not how many people actually buy, which may
be limited by rationing, but how many people would like to buy. Becker (1991) and Karni
and Levin (1994) follow this route, and assume willingness to pay is increasing in quantity
demanded, not quantity sold. Basu (1987) takes a related approach, where willingness to
pay depends directly on excess demand.
If the bandwagon effect were modeled in terms of informational cascades, as in Bikhchan-
dani et al. (1992) and Banerjee (1992), then the relevant issue would again be consumers’
expectation of demand, not necessarily of sales. A consumer who knows that others have
private information about quality is interested in discovering how many people would like to
buy the good, regardless of whether rationing prevents them from actually doing so.8
A key assumption of the paper is that consumers can directly observe quantity sold, but
not quantity demanded; when quantity sold equals capacity, they cannot observe the extent
of excess demand. This assumption is more reasonable in some settings than in others. It
may be easier to see the number of people standing in the queue outside a nightclub than
to see the number of people inside. In contrast, a person glancing into a restaurant may
observe that the tables are full, without getting a good sense of how many people have been
turned away for lack of space. Similarly, people can easily check the number of tickets sold
for major sporting events, as these figures are consistently reported in the press. It is more
difficult to find precise information on the number of people who tried to buy tickets, but
were unable to do so.
Various papers have explored how a firm can benefit from rationing, either by imposing a
7Throughout the paper, I will write “lower than expected” to mean lower than the ex-ante expectation
of both the firm and of consumers.
8This distinction would only be relevant in a model combining informational cascades and rationing,
something which has yet to be examined.
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capacity constraint or setting a price that creates excess demand. One important difference
is that none of these papers look at how restricting capacity can influence consumer beliefs.
Another is that they identify benefits to actually having excess demand, whereas I show the
benefit of having naive consumers mistakenly believe there is excess demand.
DeSerpa and Faith (1996) argue rationing can be useful if serving consumers with a low
intrinsic valuation generates positive externalities. For example, many people appreciate
loud cheering at a sporting event, but those who tend to cheer the most may be unable to
pay a high ticket price. A random rationing rule then allows some of these low valuation
consumers to be served, which increases the willingness to pay of others. DeGraba (1995)
shows that the threat of future rationing can convince consumers to buy early, which can
increase profits if valuations become more heterogeneous over time. Nocke and Peitz (2007)
also look at the threat of future rationing, and show how it can induce high valuation
consumers to separate and purchase before low valuation consumers. Denicolo and Garella
(1999) consider a durable goods monopoly, and show excess demand can be optimal if the
rationing rule is not efficient. Rationing then effectively shifts some high valuation consumers
from earlier to later periods, smoothing demand over time and helping the firm commit to
a higher price.
The paper in this literature that is closest to the current work is Becker (1991). Becker
also assumes that there are social effects to consumption, and that willingness to pay is
increasing in aggregate quantity demanded. He shows that if social effects are strong enough
to make aggregate demand upwards sloping, then a capacity constrained monopolist may
choose to have excess demand. Marginally increasing the price could then cause demand to
collapse to zero.
Although Becker considers the same social effects, many other important features of the
model are different. He looks at a one shot game, where the results rely both on demand being
upwards sloping and on the capacity constraint being exogenous. There is no uncertainty,
so influencing beliefs plays no role. In contrast, I assume that the capacity constraint is
endogenous, and it is the presence of naive consumers, not any upwards sloping demand,
which drives the results. As noted above, there are also important differences in the results
themselves.
The idea that some consumers do not fully understand how other people’s equilibrium
actions depend on their private information is also quite reasonable. The approach I take is
related to that of cursed equilibrium, as in Eyster and Rabin (2005). It also follows in a recent
strand of literature in industrial organization looking at how firms can hide information from
boundedly rational consumers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model, and Section
2.3 presents some of the related literature dealing with naive consumers. Section 2.4 contains
the analysis, and discusses the intuition for the results. Section 2.5 concludes.
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2 The Model
A monopolist produces a homogeneous good at constant marginal cost, normalized to zero.
It faces a market of consumers who have unit demand in each of two periods, where the
discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1].
The total number of consumers in the market is known to the firm, but not to all con-
sumers. There is a mass M of potential consumers, but the actual mass of consumers in the
market is xM , where x is a draw of a random variable X distributed according to F with
full support on (0, 1].9
Each consumer’s willingness to pay for the good consists of two parts, intrinsic utility
and social utility. A consumer’s intrinsic utility from buying is an independent draw from a
uniform distribution on [−A0, A], where A0 > 0, A > 0 and A0 + A = M .10
A consumer’s social utility from buying is Cq(p,x), where C < 1 is a strictly positive
constant and q(p, x) is aggregate quantity demanded at price p when X = x. If a consumer
does not buy the good, then his utility in that period is zero. A consumer’s willingness to pay
is equal to his expected utility from buying, which is his intrinsic utility plus CE[q(p,X)].
Here, E[q(p,X)] is the consumer’s expectation of quantity demanded taken over X.
There are two types of consumers: a fraction 1−α are informed and sophisticated, while a
fraction α are uninformed and naive, with α ∈ (0, 1]. Informed and sophisticated consumers
observe the value of x and are fully rational, in the standard sense. Uninformed and naive
consumers just know how X is distributed. They are rational, except they do not take into
account how the firm’s equilibrium strategy may be related to its private information about
x. Naive consumers update their beliefs using Bayes’ rule, by reasoning what values of x
are consistent with the quantity sold they observe. However, they do not condition these
beliefs directly on the firm’s strategy. In short, the firm cannot signal to naive consumers.
Intrinsic utility is unrelated to consumers’ information or degree of sophistication, so that
the intrinsic utility of both types of consumers is uniformly distributed on [−A0, A].11
The game proceeds as follows. In period 0, nature draws a single value of x which is
observed by the firm and by informed consumers. This draw determines the number of
consumers in the market, which is constant across periods. In period 1, the firm decides
whether to impose a capacity constraint and, if so, chooses a value of K > 0. If the firm
imposes a capacity constraint with a given K, then quantity sold cannot exceed K in either
period: Qt ≤ K, for t ∈ {1, 2}. The firm also sets a period 1 price, p1.
9The mechanism should apply equally well if each consumer was uncertain about other consumers’ prefer-
ences. However, modeling uncertainty in terms of the number of consumers in the market has two practical
advantages. It means a consumer cannot infer anything about aggregate demand from his own willingness
to pay. It also means that social effects will just change the slope of the inverse demand function and not
its intercept, which simplifies the analysis.
10The assumption that intrinsic utility can be negative is simply to avoid corner solutions after taking into
account social effects, as explained below.
11A more general treatment would also include consumers who are uninformed but sophisticated. This
would introduce the possibility of signaling, which would complicate the analysis. Assuming there are no
such consumers allows me to concentrate on the main issue of the paper, which is the firm’s incentive to
manipulate naive consumers.
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Each consumer observes p1 and K if there is a capacity constraint, and decides whether
to buy a unit of the good. Aggregate quantity demanded is then q1. If q1 > K, then a mass
K of consumers are allocated the good according to some rationing rule, the details of which
are unimportant for the results. After consumers buy the good, they observe Q1 but not q1,
and naive consumers update their beliefs about X. The firm earns period 1 profits pi1.
In period 2, the firm sets price p2, and each consumer again decides whether to buy a
unit of the good. This gives aggregate quantity demanded q2. As before, if q2 > K, then a
mass K of consumers are allocated the good according to the rationing rule. The firm earns
period 2 profits pi2, and the game ends.
The firm chooses the strategy which maximizes profits, where I assume it will only impose
a capacity constraint if doing so yields strictly higher profits. This will mean I need not
consider situations where the firm is indifferent between not setting a capacity constraint,
and setting a constraint with such a high value of K that it will never bind.
The assumption C < 1 will imply that the demand curve is downward sloping. While
this is not essential for the analysis, it is necessary to have interior solutions. With a uniform
distribution of intrinsic utility, C ≥ 1 would imply that the firm always chooses to sell to
all consumers in the market. Downward sloping demand also means that there is no issue
of multiple equilibria. The assumption C < 1 sets the analysis firmly apart from Becker
(1991), whose results depend on demand being upwards sloping on at least some interval.
To guarantee interior solutions, the intrinsic utility of the consumer who is least willing
to buy must be sufficiently negative. If all M consumers are expected to buy, then the
willingness to pay of the consumer with the lowest intrinsic utility is −A0 + CM . I assume
that
(
C
1− C )A ≤ A0
which ensures that this consumer’s willingness to pay is never greater than zero. The
assumption M = A0 + A ensures that A0 and M play no further role in the analysis.
In terms of notation, I use a number of different subscripts. The first subscript refers to
period t ∈ {1, 2}. The second subscript refers to whether the firm has imposed a capacity
constraint, c, or not, u, which stand for “constrained” and “unconstrained”. For period
t, I use qtc for quantity demanded, Qtc for quantity sold, and pitc for profits if the firm has
imposed a capacity constraint, and I use qtu, Qtu, and pitu if the firm has not. I abuse notation
somewhat and also use qtc and qtu to refer to the demand function in period t. Finally, I
sometimes use the subscripts N and S to refer to demand from naive and sophisticated
consumers.
3 Literature on Naive Consumers
A key element of the model that will drive the results is the presence of naive consumers, who
are unable to directly infer anything about demand by observing the actions taken by the
firm. Naive consumers are not irrational, and in many ways are actually quite sophisticated.
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They understand the equilibrium strategies of other consumers, and they maximize their
expected utility. Naive consumers also use Bayes’ rule when updating their beliefs about
aggregate demand, taking into account the price and quantity sold that they observe. These
consumers are only naive in the sense that they do not realize that the firm acts strategically,
that its equilibrium actions will depend on the information it has about demand.
This approach is consistent with evidence suggesting that people may not fully realize
how other people’s actions depend on their private information. One such case is the win-
ner’s curse in common value auctions. This can occur if a bidder does not understand that
others will only place low bids, allowing him to win, if they have negative private informa-
tion about the object’s value. Another is where people may still trade in situations with
asymmetric information, where Bayesian Nash equilibrium predicts no trade should occur.
An uninformed buyer may not appreciate that the seller’s decision to accept an offer will
depend on his private information about the good’s value, so that he unwittingly ends up
buying a “lemon” (Holt and Sherman, 1994).
Eyster and Rabin (2005) consider naive consumers in games of incomplete information,
and define what they call a cursed equilibrium. A player is cursed if he correctly predicts
the distribution of equilibrium actions, but underestimates the extent to which these actions
correspond to other players’ types. The situation here where all consumers are naive corre-
sponds to their fully cursed equilibrium, where no player infers anything about demand from
the firm’s choice of price or capacity. The situation where only some consumers are naive is
somewhat different from what they call a partially cursed equilibrium. There, all consumers
underestimate the extent to which equilibrium actions are related to private information,
but only to a certain degree.
A related approach is Jehiel (2005)’s concept of analogy based expectation equilibrium,
where each player groups others into analogy classes and expects them to act as the aver-
age player in that class. In a situation with incomplete information, for a certain analogy
partition, this solution concept is equivalent to that of fully cursed equilibrium (Jehiel and
Koessler, 2008). Behavioral equilibrium, as proposed by Esponda (2008), adds the require-
ment that naive players’ beliefs must be consistent with the information revealed from the
outcome of equilibrium play. The results here can be seen in this light, as naive consumers’
whose beliefs are manipulated never discover that they have been fooled.
An important feature of this paper is that a capacity constraint can prevent naive con-
sumers from inferring the true level of demand. This relates to recent work in industrial
organization on how firms may try to hide information from boundedly rational consumers.
Gabaix and Laibson (2006) show firms may use shrouding to fool naive consumers who are
not aware that it charges add-on prices. Spiegler (2006) considers consumers who evaluate
a product by only sampling quality in one dimension, and shows firms may obfuscate by
randomizing over quality in other dimensions. Chioveanu and Zhou (2009) and Piccione and
Spiegler (2009) look at price competition with framing, where firms choose both prices and
the frames in which prices are presented. By randomizing over both prices and frames, the
firm can prevent consumers from making price comparisons.
These papers all examine why a firm may want to prevent consumers from learning about
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its own prices or products, or those of its competitors. What I show in the following section
is related but has a somewhat different flavor: that a firm may want to prevent consumers
from learning about each others’ actions.
4 Analysis
I first show how aggregate demand in a given period will depend on the beliefs of naive
consumers. Because of social effects, the willingness to pay of naive consumers is increasing
in their expectation of quantity demanded. The only thing uncertain is the number of
consumers in the market, so willingness to pay can be expressed as a function of naive
consumers’ beliefs about the distribution of X. I now show that these beliefs will affect
aggregate demand through naive consumers’ expectation of X, E[X], and their expectation
of various increasing functions of X.
Let qN denote the demand of naive consumers, and qS the demand of sophisticated
consumers. Aggregate demand is then qN + qS.
The quantity demanded by naive consumers is equal to their number in the market,
αxM , multiplied by the fraction of these consumers for whom the utility of buying exceeds
the price. Naive consumers do not know the value of x, so that buying gives expected social
utility CE[qN + qS]. Intrinsic utility is uniformly distributed on [−A0, A], which means that
the fraction of naive consumers who will buy is (A + CE[qN + qS] − p)/(A + A0). The
denominator equals M by assumption, so that demand from naive consumers is
qN = α(A+ CE[qN + qS]− p)x. (1)
The demand from sophisticated consumers is given by a similar expression, where α is
replaced by (1 − α). An important difference is that naive consumers know the value of x,
so their social utility is C(qN + qS), rather than its expectation
qS = (1− α)(A+ C(qN + qS)− p)x. (2)
Taking (2) and solving for qS gives
qS = (1− α)x
[ 1
1− (1− α)Cx
]
(A− p+ CqN), (3)
which expresses qS as a function of qN .
Looking at (1) shows that qN is proportional to x. That is, I can write qN = Hx, where H
depends on naive consumers’ beliefs about the distribution of X and on different parameters,
but not directly on the actual number of consumers in the market, x.
Substituting (3) into (1) and using qN = Hx gives
Hx = αx
{
A− p+ CE[HX] + CE
[
[
(1− α)X
1− (1− α)CX ](A− p+ CHX)
]}
.
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Both sides are linear in H, so there is a unique expression for H which satisfies this
equality. That is
H = α(A− p)
{
1 + E[ (1−α)CX
1−(1−α)CX ]
1− αCE[X]− αCE[ (1−α)CX2
1−(1−α)CX ]
}
.
It will be convenient to define G = H/α(A − p), where G captures the part of H that
depends on naive consumers’ beliefs about X. That is
G =
1 + E[ (1−α)CX
1−(1−α)CX ]
1− αCE[X]− αCE[ (1−α)CX2
1−(1−α)CX ]
. (4)
Each expectation in G is taken given naive consumers’ beliefs about the distribution of
X. I will often make these beliefs explicit by including a subscript to G. For example, I
will write GF if naive consumer believe that X follows the prior distribution F (X), GX>x0
if they infer that the value of X is greater than some x0 ∈ (0, 1), and GX=x0 if they infer
that X = x0.
The expressions within each expectation in G are increasing in x. This implies that G
is increasing in naive consumers’ beliefs about X, in that we have GF2 > GF1 whenever F2
first-order stochastic dominates F1.
Explicit expressions for quantity demanded are then
qN = αxG(A− p), (5)
qS = (1− α)x
[ 1 + αxCG
1− (1− α)Cx
]
(A− p). (6)
In the absence of social effects, C = 0, we have G = 1 and so aggregate demand simplifies
to x(A−p). As expected, this is just the number of consumers in the market whose intrinsic
utility from buying exceeds the price.
Looking at (5) and (6) shows that social effects do increase demand, but not by shifting
up the demand curve. Regardless of the value of C or of consumers’ beliefs about X, the
firm will not make any sales if it charges a price higher than the intrinsic utility of the top
consumer, p > A. If the firm did charge such a price, and consumers expected no one to buy,
then expected social utility from buying would be zero. It would then indeed be optimal for
no consumer to buy. Instead, social effects increase demand by flattening out the demand
curve, reducing the magnitude of its slope.
The full information case is given by α = 0, or GX=x which simplifies to G = 1/(1−Cx).
All consumers then observe x, and aggregate demand simplifies to x(A− p)/(1− Cx). The
denominator reflects the increased willingness to pay generated through social effects.
(5) and (6), reflect the fact that a change in naive consumers’ beliefs about X have
both a direct and an indirect effect on aggregate demand. More favorable beliefs about X,
in the sense of believing there are likely many consumers in the market, directly increase
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the expected social utility of naive consumers who buy. This will increase their quantity
demanded at any given price.
The increased demand of naive consumers, combined with social effects, are what create
an indirect effect of beliefs on aggregate demand. Higher demand from naive consumers
increases the social utility of all consumers who buy. In particular, this increases demand
from sophisticated consumers, which in turn will increase the willingness to pay of naive
consumers through social effects.
In this way, social effects create a feedback mechanism through which a small change in
beliefs about X can trigger a relatively large change in aggregate demand. In particular,
this will be the case when both C and E[X] are close to 1, in which case the denominator
of G is close to zero.
Now that I have established how aggregate demand depends on consumer beliefs, I turn
to the problem faced by the firm. The first proposition considers a situation where the firm
does not impose a capacity constraint. It describes the demand the firm will then face in
each period, and its optimal price.
Proposition 1. Suppose the firm does not impose a capacity constraint. Then period 1
demand is
q1u =
{
(1− α)[ 1 + αxCGF
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGF
}
x(A− p), (7)
where GF is given by (4), and where expectations are calculated using the prior distribu-
tion F (X).
Period 2 demand is
q2u =
x
1− Cx(A− p). (8)
The firm will set prices p1 = p2 = A/2 and earn
pi1u =
{
(1− α)[ 1 + αxCGF
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGF
}
x(
A2
4
), (9)
pi2u =
x
1− Cx(
A4
4
), (10)
giving total profits
piu = x(
A2
4
)
{
(1− α)[ 1 + αxCGF
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGF +
(
δ
1− Cx
)}
. (11)
Proof. In period 1, naive consumers believe X follows the prior distribution, F [X]. From
(5) and (6), total period 1 demand from the two groups of consumers is then q1u = qS + qN ,
given by (7), where expectations in G are calculated using the prior distribution.
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Consumers observe period 1 quantity sold, Q1u, and since there is no capacity constraint
this must equal q1u. Consumers are then able to infer the exact value of x, because (7) is
strictly increasing in x.
Period 2 demand is then given by (5) and (6), but with G replaced by
GX=x =
1 + (1−α)Cx
1−(1−α)Cx
1− αCx− α (1−α)Cx2
1−(1−α)Cx
.
which simplifies to 1/(1− Cx).
Demand from naive consumers is then
qN = α
x
1− Cx(A− p),
and demand from sophisticated consumers simplifies to
qS = (1− α) x
1− Cx(A− p).
Period 2 demand, q2u = qS + qN , is then given by (8).
Both q1u and q2u are proportional to (A− p), and marginal costs are zero, so the optimal
price is p1 = p2 = A/2. This implies
Q1u =
{
(1− α)
[
1 + αxCGF
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGF
)
x(
A
2
), (12)
Q2u =
x
1− Cx(
A
2
). (13)
Period 1 profits pi1u are therefore given by (9), and period 2 profits pi2u by (10). Total
profits are then pi1u + δpi2u, which is given by (11).
In both period 1 and period 2, demand will be the sum of qN and qS, given by (5) and
(6). The difference in demand between the two periods will depend only on the expectations
in G, because naive consumers will update their beliefs about X based on what they observe
in period 1.
In period 1, naive consumers just have their prior beliefs about X. Consumers know that
period 1 quantity demanded depends on x according to (7), and they are able to observe
quantity sold, Q1u. The key point is that when the firm does not impose a capacity constraint,
then quantity demanded and quantity sold must coincide. Naive consumers can then infer
the true value of x, and period 2 demand equals the full information case of (5) and (6) with
X = x.
If quantity demanded is lower than expected based on the prior distribution of X, so
qN + qS < E[qN + qS], then naive consumers adjust their beliefs downwards after period 1,
and this will itself cause demand to decrease in period 2. In contrast, if quantity demanded
is higher than expected based on the prior, qN + qS > E[qN + qS], then naive consumers
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adjust their beliefs upwards after period 1 and this will cause demand to increase in period
2.
An additional point is how naive consumer’s expectation of demand, E[qN + qS], relates
to their expectation of the number of consumers in the market, E[X]. From (7), qN + qS
is strictly convex in x, which is a result of three factors: the presence of social effects, that
sophisticated consumers know the value of x before buying, and that the effect of x on
demand is multiplicative.
Convexity implies that, for given naive consumer beliefs, aggregate demand is increasing
in the mass of consumers in the market but at an increasing rate. If the mass of consumers
takes on it expected value, then aggregate demand will actually be lower than expected:
x = E[X] implies qN + qS < E[qN + qS]. This is because it is the large values of x close to 1
that make the greatest contribution to the expectation E[qN + qS]. For demand to be higher
than naive consumers’ expect, x must be sufficiently larger than E[X].
Finally, the fact that demand is linear with maximum willingness to pay A, and that
marginal cost is zero, explains why the optimal price is constant at p1 = p2 = A/2.
I now consider the strategy of a firm which decides to impose a capacity constraint. Period
1 demand will be the same as it was without a constraint, q1c = q1u, given by (7), because
naive consumers will again believe that X follows the prior distribution F [X]. However, a
capacity constraint will cause period 2 demand to change. It will do so by preventing naive
consumers from inferring the true value of x.
A firm which chooses a capacity constraint must decide on its level, K, and also on a
price in each period. I first show that if the firm imposes a capacity constraint, then it will
exactly bind in both periods, and prices will increase over time.
Proposition 2. Let pic denote the maximum profits the firm can earn by setting a capacity
constraint and optimally choosing K, p1 and p2. Suppose x takes on a value such that it is
profitable to set a capacity constraint: pic > piu, with piu given by (11). Then the firm will
set p1 and p2 such that quantity demanded equals capacity: q1c = Q1c = q2c = Q2c = K.
Moreover, we will have p1 < A/2 < p2.
Proof. As in Proposition 1, period 1 demand q1c is given by (7). Demand is the same as
without a capacity constraint, but now quantity sold cannot exceed capacity, Q1c ≤ K. This
means period 1 profits can be no greater than they would be without a capacity constraint:
pi1c ≤ pi1u, where pi1u is given by (9).
Suppose the firm sets p1 so that period 1 quantity demanded is strictly less than capacity,
q1c < K. Then q1c = Q1c < K, and by the same argument as in the proof of Proposition
1, naive consumers can infer the exact value of x. This means q2c is given by (8), as it was
without a capacity constraint. The only effect of the capacity constraint in period 2 is to
restrict quantity sold, Q2c ≤ K. Period 2 profits are therefore no greater than they would
be without a capacity constraint: pi2c ≤ pi2u, with pi2u given by (10). But this contradicts
pic > piu, so it must be that q1c ≥ K, and Q1c = K. That is, the capacity constraint must
bind in period 1.
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Consumers then observe that Q1c = K at the end of period 1, and naive consumers
update their beliefs about x. From (7), q1c is strictly increasing in x. Naive consumers
therefore infer that x ≥ x′, where x′ is the lowest value of x such that q1c ≥ K. That is,
x′ = x would imply q1c = K. Period 2 demand, q2c, is then given by (7) but with GF replaced
by GX>x′ .
I argue that the firm must set p1 so that q1c = K, and hence x
′ = x. If instead q1c > K,
then there would be strictly positive excess demand. The firm could marginally increase
p1 and still sell Q1c = K, which would increase pi1c. This marginal change in price would
also change the way that naive consumers update their beliefs. From (7), q1c is strictly
decreasing in p but strictly increasing in x, which implies x′ is increasing in p. A marginal
increase of p1 therefore increases x
′, as long as quantity demanded is still greater than or
equal to capacity. But marginally increasing x′ leads to a new distribution F (X|X ≥ x′)
that first order stochastically dominates the previous one, and so GX≥x′ increases.
Period 2 demand is given by (7) but with GF replaced by GX≥x′ , so we know that q2c
is increasing in GX≥x′ . A marginal increase in p1 therefore increases q2c, and the firm can
charge a higher price for any given quantity sold. Period 2 profits are now higher as well,
which is a contradiction. It therefore follows that the optimal p1 must give q1c = K and
x′ = x.
Period 2 demand is then given by (7), but with GF replaced by GX≥x
qS = (1− α)x
[
1 + αxCGX≥x
1− (1− α)Cx
]
(A− p),
qN = αxGX≥x(A− p),
q2c =
{
(1− α)
[
1 + αCxGX≥x
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGX≥x
}
x(A− p). (14)
Period 2 demand, q2c, is proportional to A − p. If the firm did not have a capacity
constraint in period 2, then period 2 profits would be given by pi2 = p2q2c. These profits
would be quadratic in p2, or equivalently quadratic in q2c. The firm would then choose
p2 = A/2. Denote the resulting unconstrained, optimal quantity sold by Q
′
2, which is (14)
evaluated at p2 = A/2. Of course, the firm may not be able to actually choose Q2c = Q
′
2,
because of the constraint Q2c ≤ K.
From Proposition 1, the optimal period 1 price without a capacity constraint is p1 = A/2,
with quantity sold q1u = Q1u, given by (12). The unconstrained optimal price is the same
in each period, p = A/2. We therefore have Q1u < Q
′
2, since GF < GX≥x implies q1u < q2c.
This means that, fixing naive consumer beliefs about the distribution of X at F (X) in period
1 and at F (X|X ≥ x) in period 2, the firm would like to increase quantity sold over time.
By (7) and q1c = K, the firm with capacity constraint K will set period 1 price
p1 = A− K
x
{
(1− α)
[
1 + αCxGF
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGF
}−1
.
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Period 1 profits are then p1K, so
pi1c = AK − K
2
x
{
(1− α)
[
1 + αCxGF
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGF
}−1
. (15)
Define the loss function λ1(K) as pi1u−pi1c, given by (9) and (15). It is the loss in period
1 profits from selling quantity K rather than the unconstrained optimum Q1u. The loss
function is positive and increasing quadratically in |K −Q1u|. It takes on a value of zero at
K = Q1u, as does its derivative with respect to K.
Define the loss function λ2(K) in a similar way. It is pi2c− (A/2)Q′2, so the loss in period
2 profits from setting a capacity constraint K and choosing the corresponding best value
of p2, rather than setting p = A/2 and selling the unconstrained optimum Q
′
2. The loss
function takes on a value of zero for all K > Q
′
2, since then the capacity constraint does not
bind in period 2 and the firm can just sell Q
′
2.
Period 2 profits, pi2c, are strictly increasing in Q2c whenever Q2c < Q
′
2. This means that
for any K ≤ Q′2, the firm maximizes period 2 profits by setting Q2c as close as possible to the
unconstrained optimum Q
′
2: Q2c = K. Any higher price would decrease Q2c further away
from Q
′
2, and any lower price would generate strictly positive excess demand.
For any K ≤ Q′2, (14) and q2c = K imply that the firm with capacity constraint K will
set period 2 price
p2 = A− K
x
{
(1− α)
[
1 + αCxGX≥x
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGX≥x
}−1
,
and earn period 2 profits
pi2c = AK − K
2
x
{
(1− α)
[
1 + αCxGX≥x
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGX≥x
}−1
. (16)
This shows that for any K ≤ Q′2, the loss function λ2(K) is decreasing quadratically in
K. It takes on a value of zero at K = Q
′
2, as does its derivative with respect to K.
The firm chooses K to maximize pi = pi1c + δpi2c, which is equivalent to minimizing
λ1(K) + δλ2(K). For the optimal K, we cannot have K < Q1u, since then marginally
increasing K would decrease both λ1(K) and λ2(K). Similarly, we cannot have K > Q
′
2,
since then marginally decreasing K would decrease λ1(K) while leaving λ2(K) unchanged.
This implies Q1u ≤ K ≤ Q′2. For any such K, λ1(K) is increasing in K while λ2(K) is
decreasing in K.
The derivative of λ1(K) is zero at K = Q1u, while the derivative of λ2(K) is strictly
negative. Also, the derivative of λ2(K) is zero at K = Q
′
2, while the derivative of λ1(K) is
strictly positive. This implies that to minimize the weighted sum of λ1(K) and λ2(K), the
firm must choose Q1u < K < Q
′
2.
Setting p1 = A/2 would give q1c = Q1u, and setting p2 = A/2 would give q2c = Q
′
2.
Quantity demanded is decreasing in price, so Q1u < Q1c implies p1 < A/2 and Q2c < Q
′
2
implies p2 > A/2.
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The result shows that if the firm can profitably use a capacity constraint, and if K is
chosen optimally, then the constraint will exactly bind in both periods. Naive consumers
will then observe that period 1 quantity sold equals capacity. Because they are naive, these
consumers do not conclude from the firm’s equilibrium strategy that excess demand must be
zero. Instead, they just infer that quantity demanded is greater than or equal to capacity.
In short, naive consumers will be fooled into believing demand is greater than it actually
is. The belief that X is distributed according to the prior F (X) will be replaced in the
expression for demand by the belief that X is distributed according to F (X|X ≥ x). The
fact that the capacity constraint exactly binds makes this conditional expectation as high
as possible. The new, more positive beliefs will increase consumers’ willingness to pay in
period 2, both through the direct and indirect effect described before Proposition 1.
Using a capacity constraint means that demand will always increase going from period
1 to period 2. However, using a capacity constraint also means the firm cannot take full
advantage of this increased demand, because it cannot increase output. The firm would like
to sell strictly more in period 2 than in period 1, but the capacity constraint limits quantity
sold to K.
The optimal choice of K reflects a trade-off between period 1 and period 2 profits. The
firm will choose a capacity level between the optimal period 1 quantity and the optimal
period 2 quantity, where the exact value of K depends on how the firm weighs profits in
each period.
Since quantity sold is the same in each period, prices must increase over time. Moreover,
the period 1 price is lower than that which would maximize period 1 profits without a
constraint, p = A/2, while the period 2 price is higher.
Because the capacity constraint binds in both periods, naive consumers never discover
they have been fooled. They observe that quantity sold equals capacity in period 2, which
again leaves them unable to infer the true level of demand. Unlike in period 1, the reason the
capacity constraint binds has nothing to do with influencing beliefs. The capacity constraint
binds in period 2 because the firm would like to increase quantity sold in response to the
increased demand, but it is prevented from doing so by its capacity constraint.
The next proposition describes under what conditions the firm will impose a capacity
constraint.
Proposition 3. The firm will impose a capacity constraint whenever period 1 demand is
lower than naive consumers’ expectation under the prior, but will not impose a capacity
constraint if period 1 demand is sufficiently high.
Specifically, let x0 > E[X] be the value of x for which E[q1] = q1, defined implicity by
1/(1− Cx0) = GF given by (4).
Then there exists a critical value x′, with x0 < x′, such that pic > piu for all x ∈ [0, x′).
There also exists a critical value x′′, with x′ < x′′ < 1, such that pic ≤ piu for any x ∈ (x′′, 1].
Proof. From q1 = qN + qS and (6), demand will remain unchanged after period 1 if and only
if qN remains unchanged. By (5), this requires E[qN + qS] = qN + qS, and by (5) and (6),
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this requires to G to remain unchanged. If consumers infer X = x after period 1, then this
amounts to GX=x0 = GF , or using GX=x = 1/(1− Cx),
1
1− Cx0 = GF .
The fact that x0 > E[X] follows immediately from (4). All expressions within the
expectations of G are convex in x, and some are strictly convex.
Suppose x < x0, and the firm does not impose a capacity constraint. By Proposition 1, it
will then set p1 = p2 = A/2. Quantity sold is then Q1u given by (12) and Q2u given by (13).
Per period profits are pi1u given by (9) and pi2u by (10). We have q2u < q1u, since q1 < E[q1],
so Q2u < Q1u. Quantity sold in period 2 is less than quantity sold in period 1.
Now say the firm imposes a capacity constraint K = Q1u, and sets p1 = p2 = A/2.
Period 1 demand and quantity sold is then the same as without a constraint, Q1c = Q1u, so
pi1c = pi1u. Quantity demanded equals capacity, q1c = K, so naive consumers update their
beliefs from F (X) to F (X|X ≥ x). This implies period 2 demand is higher than period 1
demand, q2c > q1u, as q2c is given by (14) and GX≥x > GF . At price p2 = A/2, the firm
can sell quantity Q2c = Q1c = K. Combined with Q2u < Q1u and Q1u = Q1c, this implies
Q2u < Q2c. Profits are therefore strictly higher than piu, and the firm would prefer to use a
capacity constraint.
If x = x0, then the optimal price without a capacity constraint is still p1 = p2 = A/2.
Naive consumers’ expectation of qN + qS turns out to be correct, so period 2 demand is just
equal to period 1 demand. Quantity sold is Q1u = Q2u, given by (13).
If the firm imposes a capacity constraint K = Q1u and sets p1 = A/2, then again we have
pi1c = pi1u. Just as above, we have q2c > q1c because GX≥x > GF . Setting p2 = A/2 yields
strictly positive excess demand in period 2, so the firm can charge p2 marginally higher than
A/2 and still sell Q2c = Q1c = K. Period 2 profits are therefore strictly higher than pi2u, and
the firm would prefer to use a capacity constraint.
Profits are continuous in x, so the same conclusion must hold for x > x0, if x is sufficiently
close to x0. This implies there is a critical value x
′, with x0 < x′, such that pic > piu for all
x ∈ [0, x′).
Now suppose x = 1. Then F (X|X ≥ x) = x, the distribution which places probability
1 on X taking on its true value x = 1. This means that period 2 demand is the same
regardless of whether the firm imposes a capacity constraint: comparing (8) and (14), we
have q2c = q2u because GX≥1 = GX=1. A capacity constraint just constrains Q2c ≤ K, so
we must have pi2u ≥ pi2c. By Proposition 2, if the capacity constraint binds, then we have
Q1c = K, where the proof showed that K > Q1u. Period 1 quantity sold is strictly greater
than the unconstrained optimum, which implies pi1u > pi1c. This implies piu > pic, and the
firm will prefer not to use a capacity constraint.
Finally, suppose x < 1. Again by Proposition 2, if the capacity constraint binds, then
the firm will set p1 and p2 such that Q1c = Q2c = K. Moreover, Q1u < K < Q
′
2, with Q
′
2
given by (14) evaluated at p2 = A/2. Recall that Q
′
2 is the optimal quantity sold if naive
consumers held beliefs F (X|X ≥ x) and the firm was not capacity constrained.
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As x tends to 1, F [X|X ≥ x] tends to the distribution that places probability 1 on X
taking on its true value x = 1. Demand is continuous in x, and when x = 1 we have q2c = q2u.
This means that q2c must tend to q2u as x tends to 1.
In the limit, we must therefore have pi2c ≤ pi2u. Since pi1u ≥ pi1c, the only way that
pic ≥ piu can hold for x sufficiently close to 1, is if both pi1u − pi1c and pi2u − pi2c tend to zero
as x tends to 1.
For pi2u − pi2c to tend to zero, Q2c must tend to the unconstrained optimum Q′2. But
Q2c = K, so K must tend to Q
′
2 as well. From the proof of Proposition 2, we know that
Q1u < Q
′
2, so if K tends to Q
′
2, we have K > Q1u. But by Q1c = K, this implies period 1
output is strictly higher than the unconstrained optimum, and in the limit pi1u > pi1c . This
implies that for x sufficiently close to 1, profits are strictly higher without a binding capacity
constraint.
The result shows that consumers will observe a sell-out when demand is low, not when
it is high. This is a very different conclusion than one would likely reach if capacity was
exogenous, or if the firm was uninformed about demand. In that case, it would seem intuitive
that a sell-out be associated with high demand.
What drives the results is that the firm imposes a capacity constraint with the express
purpose of fooling naive consumers. Naive consumers do associate a sell-out with high
demand, because they ignore the firm’s strategic behavior. It is precisely the fact that naive
consumers make this inference that gives the firm an incentive to fool them when demand
is low.
From the perspective of the firm, the decision to impose a capacity constraint generates
a benefit, but also an implicit cost. The benefit of a capacity constraint is that it makes
period 2 demand higher than it otherwise would have been. The discussion after Proposition
2 showed that imposing a capacity constraint causes demand to increase after period 1. More
to the point, it also ensures period 2 demand is higher than if the firm had not imposed a
constraint: q2c > q2u.
The implicit cost of a capacity constraint is that the firm cannot increase output over
time. Without a constraint, the firm can maximize period 2 profits by selling Q2u, which
is the optimal output given demand q2u. If period 1 turns out to be higher than naive
consumers expected, then they adjust their beliefs upward after inferring the true value of x,
and quantity sold increases over time. With a capacity constraint, increasing quantity sold
in this way is impossible. For certain values of x, a capacity constrained firm will be forced
to sell less in period 2 than if it had not imposed the constraint: Q2c < Q2u.
Whether imposing a capacity constraint increases profits depends on how the benefit
compares to the possible cost. If demand is lower than expected, q1 ≤ E[q1], then demand
would decrease over time without a capacity constraint. There would then be no question
of increasing output in period 2, and the firm would choose some Q2u ≤ Q1u.
Proposition 2 states that a firm with a capacity constraint will choose K greater than
the unconstrained period 1 quantity sold: K = Q1c > Q1u. This constraint will not force
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the firm to sell less than Q1c in period 2, so the implicit cost of a capacity constraint is zero.
Its only effect is to increase period 2 demand and increase profits.
The cost and benefits of a capacity constraint are different if x is close to 1. A capacity
constraint will then fool naive consumers by very little, since the distribution F (X|X ≥ x)
only puts weights on values of X close to x = 1. Imposing a capacity constraint therefore has
little effect on period 2 demand. In contrast, a large value of x means that a firm without
a constraint would certainly expand output in period 2, which leads to Q2u > Q2c. In this
case, the cost of a capacity constraint will exceed the benefit.12
An important reason behind Proposition 3, as well as for the other results in this paper, is
that aggregate demand is positively correlated across periods. I make the stark assumption
that it is perfectly correlated, so that the number of consumers in the market is the same in
each period. It is positive correlation that allows consumers who see a sell-out in period 1
to infer that demand will also be high in period 2, which in turn gives the firm an incentive
to impose a capacity constraint.
The assumption of perfect correlation is not necessary for this type of mechanism to
work, but it does simplify the analysis. If the number of consumers in the market could vary
across periods, then an important issue would be whether the firm observes both periods’
demand before imposing a capacity constraint. If not, then imposing a capacity constraint
when period 1 demand is low would now carry a positive cost. The firm would have to take
into account that period 2 demand could still be high, in which case expanding output would
be important.
Proposition 3 also implies the following corollary.
Corollary. Define x0 as in Proposition 3, 1/(1− Cx0) = GF . Then the ex-ante probability
that the firm will impose a capacity constraint is bounded below by F (x0). This probability is
therefore strictly positive even in the limit as C, α or δ tend to zero.
The corollary follows immediately because Proposition 3 showed that x0 > E[X] > 0,
and E[X] is independent of parameters C, α and δ.
This corollary shows there is a discontinuity in the firm’s optimal strategy when some
parameters equal zero. If C = 0, α = 0 or δ = 0, then the situation reduces to that without
social effects. There is then either no social utility, no naive consumers to fool, or the firm
places no weight on period 2 profits. In any such case, a capacity constraint could never
strictly increase profits.
The situation is very different if these parameters are small but strictly positive. As any
one of them tends to zero, the range of x for which a capacity constraint is profitable does
not.
The intuition is that both the cost and benefit of a capacity constraint depend on the
fraction of naive consumers and the strength of social effects. If there are few naive con-
sumers, then imposing a capacity constraint will not increase period 2 demand by very much
12Proposition 3 leaves open the question of whether the relationship between demand and the firm’s
incentive to impose a capacity constraint is monotonic. If so, the firm would impose a capacity constraint
if and only if x is below some critical value. I can show that this is the case if C is small, but whether this
holds more generally remains to be seen.
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over the unconstrained level. But having few naive consumers also means that expanding
output is less of an issue, because demand does not change much over time. In the limit,
the benefit of a capacity constraint tends to zero, but so does the cost.
The next proposition gives an explicit expression for K, the firm’s optimal capacity
constraint. The result shows that even though the firm’s decision whether or not to use a
capacity constraint is discontinuous in parameter values, the equilibrium prices and quantities
are not.
Proposition 4. The optimal capacity constraint K is given by
K =
xA(1 + δ)
2Z
,
where
Z =
{
(1−α)[ 1 + αxCGF
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+αGF
}−1
+ δ
{
(1−α)[1 + αxCGX≥x
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+αGX≥x
}−1
. (17)
K is increasing in δ. As C or α tend to zero, K tends to the unconstrained optimum
Q1u given by (12), and p1 tends to A/2.
Proof. Period 1 demand is given by (7) and period 2 demand by (14). If the firm sets
capacity constraint K, then p1 and p2 are such that q1 = q2 = K. That is
p1 = A− K
x
{
(1− α)
[
1 + αCxGF
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGF
}−1
,
p2 = A− K
x
{
(1− α)
[
1 + αCxGX≥x
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGX≥x
}−1
.
Total profits are then (p1 + δp2)K, so
pic = A(1 + δ)K − Z
x
K2,
where Z is given by (17). Profits are quadratic in K, and the first order condition gives
K =
xA(1 + δ)
2Z
. (18)
Taking the derivative of K with respect to δ, this is positive if
Z − (1 + δ)∂Z
∂δ
> 0.
From (17), this is equivalent to
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{
(1− α)
[
1 + αCxGF
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGF
}−1
>
{
(1− α)
[
1 + αCxGX≥x
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGX≥x
}−1
,
which holds because GX≥x > GX=x.
If pic > piu, then by Proposition 2 we have Q1u < K. From (17) and (18), K is continuous
in all parameters. The limit of K as C or α tend to zero is therefore equal to (18) evaluated
at C = 0 or α = 0. I now show that this is equal to Q1u evaluated at these parameter values.
Recall that Q1u was given by (12),
Q1u =
{
(1− α)
[
1 + αxCGF
1− (1− α)Cx
]
+ αGF
)
x(
A
2
).
Setting α = 0 in (17) gives Z = (1 + δ)(1 − Cx), which implies K = xA/2(1 − Cx).
Comparing with the above expression, this is the same as Q1u evaluated at α = 0. Setting
C = 0 in (17) gives G = 1 and therefore Z = (1 + δ), which implies K = xA/2. Again,
comparing with the above expression shows this is just Q1u evaluated at C = 0.
To complete the proof, note that Q1u is the quantity demanded corresponding to p1 =
A/2. If q1c = K tends to Q1u, then the firm which imposes a capacity constraint must charge
price p1 that tends to A/2.
The result shows that the firm’s optimal capacity constraint K approaches the uncon-
strained optimal quantity sold, as social effects or the fraction of naive consumers becomes
small. For small values of α or C, fooling naive consumers has little effect on period 2
demand. It is then quite intuitive that the firm should choose K = Q1c close to Q1u.
The optimal capacity constraint increases as the firm becomes more patient. By Propo-
sition 2, the firm chooses a value of K between that which would maximize period 1 profits,
and the higher level that would maximize period 2 profits. The firm’s choice of K therefore
reflects a trade-off between profits in these two periods. As the firm becomes more patient,
it places more weight on period 2 profits and it will choose to have higher capacity.
The final result follows in a similar vein, showing that a firm is more likely to impose a
capacity constraint if it is patient.
Proposition 5. The ex-ante probability that the firm will impose a capacity constraint is
strictly increasing in δ. Specifically, let Sδ ∈ [0, 1] be the set of x for which pic > piu, for given
δ. Then δ1 < δ2 implies Sδ1 ⊂ Sδ2.
Proof. Fix δ = δ1 < 1, and consider some value of x for which pic ≥ piu. If the firm does not
impose a capacity constraint, then piu = pi1u + δpi2u, with pi1u given by (9) and pi2u given by
(10). If the firm imposes the optimal capacity constraint K, then pic = pi1c + δpi2c, with pi1c
given by (15) and pi2c given by (16).
We have pic − piu = δ1(pi2c − pi2u) − (pi1u − pi1c) ≥ 0. By Proposition 2, we know that
Q1u < K. Since Q1u maximizes period 1 profits without a capacity constraint, it follows
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that pi1u > pi1c. The only way that pic ≥ piu can hold is if pi2c > pi1u. That implies both terms
in brackets in the expression for pic − piu are strictly positive.
Now consider some δ2 > δ1, and let δ = δ2. By Proposition 1, the optimal prices without
a capacity constraint remain p1 = p2 = A/2, so pi1u and pi2u are the same as when δ = δ1.
If the firm imposes a capacity constraint with δ = δ2, it can always choose the same values
of K, p1 and p2 as when δ = δ1. By so doing, it earns the same per period profits pi1c and
pi2c. But now δ2 > δ1, which implies pic − piu = δ2(pi2c − pi2u)− (pi1u − pi1c) > 0. The firm will
therefore use a capacity constraint for this value of x.
To complete the proof, it is sufficient to show that there exists some x such that pic = piu
for δ = δ1. In that case, Sδ1 will be a proper subset of Sδ2 . This is indeed the case. Profits are
continuous in x, and we have pic > piu for x ≤ E[X] and pic < piu for x close to 1. Moreover,
X has full support on [0, 1]. So for any δ, by the Intermediate Value Theorem there must
be some x with E[X] < x < 1 for which pic = piu.
The intuition behind the result is that the decision to impose a capacity constraint is
based on a trade-off between period 1 and period 2 profits. A capacity constraint has no
immediate effect on demand, and so it cannot increase period 1 profits above the uncon-
strained level. On the other hand, a capacity constraint can be optimal if its positive impact
on period 2 demand is sufficiently large. A patient firm places a higher weight on period 2
profits, and so finds a capacity constraint more attractive.
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown how a firm can use a capacity constraint to manipulate consumer
beliefs about aggregate demand. Imposing a capacity constraint and setting a price just
low enough for it to bind can fool naive consumers, who just infer that quantity demanded
must be greater than or equal to capacity. Through social effects, this increases the demand
of naive consumers in the following period. Social effects also mean this will increase the
willingness to pay of all other consumers, because they know naive consumer demand has
increased.
An important assumption throughout has been that when a capacity constraint binds,
consumers are unable to observe the extent of excess demand. For future work, it would
be interesting to apply this idea to a model where consumers choose sequentially and there
is a possibility of an information cascade. By imposing a capacity constraint, a firm could
influence the extent to which consumers observe the actions of those who have chosen earlier,
and therefore their inference about each others’ private information. The question would
then be whether restricting capacity could help trigger a positive cascade, or help sustain
one that has already started.
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